By Yuichi Kubota (auth.)
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Extra info for Armed Groups in Cambodian Civil War: Territorial Control, Rivalry, and Recruitment
Participant motivation may diminish when their priority changes. 61 To prevent their combatants from losing motivation, armed forces attempt to convince potential participants that their activities are justifiable, and thereby show their own participation to be self-rewarding. While incentives such as wages and loot or basic public services, including order and security, may win support from a broader population of apolitical civilians, identity appeals are more likely to arouse motivation in potential voluntary participants.
Yet these appeals may be replaced by other incentives provided by rival groups as the rival groups’ influence in the area is enhanced. 47 However, theories of control do not adequately predict how the character of civil-military relations differs across civil wars and pay scant attention to the internal structure of individual groups and their behavior. 48 There is also the problem of uniform function of territorial control. 49 Rather, civilians who are motivated by these factors will be less influenced, even when controlled by those who are incompatible in identity.
Moreover, this book attempts to take a closer look at the issue of sensitivity to cost and how it differs among individuals and to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary participants, whose costs have been considered uniform in the existing literature. This perspective assumes that voluntary recruits would not only be free from the cost of punishment as noncooperators but would also be relatively insensitive to the cost of punishment by the rival group. In contrast, involuntary participants, who reluctantly join the group due to a greater risk of punishment, are sensitive to the cost of taking sides with one of the armed groups and would be more likely to join the group in a location that is strictly controlled by the group but would hesitate to participate when its control becomes weak.
Armed Groups in Cambodian Civil War: Territorial Control, Rivalry, and Recruitment by Yuichi Kubota (auth.)
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