By Neil Feit
Philosophers commonly consider that the contents of our ideals and different cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that would be precise or fake, and their fact values don't range at times, position to put, or individual to individual. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down within the face of ideals in regards to the self. those are ideals that we convey via a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that in most cases, the contents of our ideals are houses. in contrast to propositions, homes lack absolute fact values that don't differ with time, position, or individual. Belief concerning the Self bargains a sustained security of the valuables thought of content material, in response to which the content material of each cognitive angle is a estate instead of a proposition. the speculation is supported with an array of latest arguments, defended from a number of objections, and utilized to a few vital difficulties and puzzles within the philosophy of brain.
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Additional resources for Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content
Suppose a dyadic propositionalist were to identify a purely descriptive proposition, P, in favor of the property theory 29 and claim that Perry’s coming to believe P partly explains his cleanup behavior. We know a bit about what P must be like, given that it is alleged to be both purely descriptive and the content of Perry’s de se belief that he himself is making a mess. Proposition P must somehow pick out Perry by means of some qualitative property, set of properties, or individual concept, and associate this with the concept or property making a mess.
This is clearly metaphysically possible. ” Now, assume for reductio that Lingens and Twin Lingens both selfascribe the property being in Main Library, Stanford. Given our stipulation, they are both correct, and hence they both have this property. But Twin Lingens is not in Stanford; he is millions of miles away in Twin Stanford. So, our assumption entails that Twin Lingens has and lacks a certain property, which is a contradiction. We are thus led to conclude that Lingens and Twin Lingens do not both self-ascribe the property being in Main Library, Stanford.
What belief, then, are we attributing to the people of whom we said that each one believes himself to be clever? According to the property theory, we are attributing a belief the content of which is the property being clever. In general, the content of a de se belief is a property that the subject takes himself or herself to have. The presupposition of Geach’s question is therefore correct. If we say that each one believes himself to be clever, we are attributing a single belief to all of them.
Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content by Neil Feit
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